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1. Introduction 
 
It is known that in the presence of environmental externalities, the resulting allocation 
is not efficient and hence there is need for government intervention. It is also known 
that if the government has at its disposal extra lump-sum (Pigouvian) policy 
instruments, then it is able to reproduce the first-best allocation. However, in the real 
world where only distorting policy instruments are available, the government has to 
choose a second-best optimal policy and hence a second-best allocation. In the 
relevant literature, such second-best policy often takes the form of distorting taxes on 
polluting generating activities like output.1   
 The goal of this paper is to study the importance of the source and size of 
uncertainty to optimal choices and the associated welfare under both a first-best and a 
second-best setup. As far as we know, this is novel. We focus on uncertainty because 
it is a big concern in environmental policy. In assessing the risks from climate change 
and the costs of averting it, there is a variety of uncertainties that contribute to big 
differences of opinion as to how, and how much, to limit emissions (on uncertainty 
and the environment, see e.g. the Congressional Budget Office paper prepared for the 
Congress of the US, 2005).2  
  Our setup is the basic stochastic neoclassical growth model augmented with the 
assumptions that pollution occurs as a by-product of output produced and 
environmental quality has a public good character. Within this setup, there is reason 
for policy intervention. There are two exogenous stochastic processes that create 
uncertainty about future outcomes and drive the stochastic dynamics of the model. The 
first is uncertainty about production technology (standard shocks to total factor 
productivity) and the second arises from uncertainty about the impact of economic 
activity on the environment. Loosely speaking, we call the former shock “economic” and 
the latter “environmental”.   
We study the implications of uncertainty for macroeconomic outcomes, 
environmental quality and, ultimately, social welfare in both second-best and first-
best allocations. Social welfare is defined as the conditional expectation of the 
discounted sum of household’s lifetime utility. Regarding second-best allocations, and 
since the decentralized equilibrium solution depends on the value of the tax rate 
                                                          
1 For environmental policy instruments, see the survey by Bovenberg and Goulder (2002). For 
environmental tax rates in growth models, see the survey by Xepapadeas (2004).  
2 There is a rich literature on the role of uncertainty in environmental policy that goes back to 
Weitzman (1974). For a review of this literature, see Bovenberg and Goulder (2002).  
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employed, we study the case in which this tax rate takes its welfare-maximizing value. 
We then compare second-best optimal tax policy and the resulting allocation to the 
first-best outcome derived by solving a fictional social planner’s problem. To solve 
the model and compute the associated welfare in each case, we approximate both the 
equilibrium solution and the welfare criterion to second-order around their non-
stochastic long-run by using the methodology of Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004). A 
second-order approximation allows us, among other things, to take into account the 
risk that economic agents face.   
Regarding the second-best regime, it should be noted that when choosing its 
distorting policy, the government aims at the following: First, to correct for pollution 
externalities. Second, to create revenues to finance public abatement in the least 
distorting way. Third, since there is also uncertainty, the risk-averse government aims 
to reduce volatility. Second-best optimal tax policy will reflect all these tasks. 
 The main results of the paper are as follows. First, while higher economic 
uncertainty reduces welfare, higher environmental uncertainty can increase welfare 
under optimal policies. Thus, environmental uncertainty stimulates a type of 
precautionary behavior that can improve welfare. Second, the relative inferiority of 
second best relative to first best depends on the source and size of extrinsic 
uncertainty. When economic uncertainty is dominant, the relative inferiority of second 
best decreases with uncertainty. By contrast, when environmental uncertainty is 
dominant, the relative inferiority of second best further deteriorates with uncertainty. 
 The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a decentralized economy 
with taxes. Section 3 presents the social planner case (first-best). Section 4 compares 
welfare under second best and first best. Section 5 closes the paper.     
 
2. Decentralized economy given taxes 
 
We augment the basic stochastic neoclassical growth model with natural resources 
and environmental policy. The economy is populated by a private agent, who derives 
utility from private consumption and the stock of environmental quality, and the 
government. The private agent consumes, saves and produces a single good. Output 
produced generates pollution and this damages environmental quality. Since the 
private agent does not internalize the effect of his/her actions on the environment, the 
decentralized equilibrium is inefficient. Hence, there is room for government 
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intervention, which here takes the form of taxes on polluting-generating output (see 
also e.g. Economides and Philippopoulos, 2008). 
 
Private agent    
The private agent’s expected utility is defined over stochastic sequences of private 
consumption, tc , and the economy’s beginning-of-period environmental quality, tQ : 
 
0
0
( , )t t t
t
E u c Q

                                                                                                         (1a) 
 
where 10    is a time preference rate and 0E  is an expectations operator based on 
the information available at time zero. 
Without loss of generality, we use for instantaneous utility: 
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1
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                                                                                         (1b) 
 
where 0 ,1 1     are the weights given to consumption and environmental 
quality respectively and 1   is a measure of risk aversion. 
The private agent’s within-period budget constraint is: 
 
1 (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
k
t t t t t t t tk k c y A k
                                                                        (2) 
 
where t t ty A k
  is current output,3 1tk  is the end-of-period capital stock, tk  is the 
beginning-of-period capital stock, tA  is a standard index of production technology 
(whose stochastic motion is defined below), 10   and 0 1k   are usual 
parameters, and 10  t  is the tax rate on (polluting) output. 
The agent chooses 1 0{ , }t t tc k

   to maximize (1a-b) subject to (2) taking policy 
variables and environmental quality as given. The latter is justified by the open-access 
and public-good features of the environment.   
  
                                                          
3 We abstract from labor-leisure choices to keep the model simpler. This is not important. 
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Natural resources and pollution   
The stock of environmental quality evolves over time according to:4     
 
1 (1 )
q q
t t t tQ Q Q p g                                                                                        (3) 
 
where the parameter 0Q   represents environmental quality without pollution, tp  is 
the current pollution flow, tg  is public spending on abatement activities, and 
0 1q   and 0   are parameters measuring respectively the degree of 
environmental persistence and how public spending is translated into actual units of 
renewable natural resources. 
The flow of pollution, tp , is modeled as a by-product of output produced, ty :   
 
t t t t t tp y A k
                                                                                                            (4) 
 
where t  is an index of pollution technology or a measure of emissions per unit of 
output.  We assume that t  is stochastic (its motion is defined below).          
 
Government budget constraint  
Assuming a balanced budget for the government, we have in each period: 
 
t t t t t tg y A k
                                                                                                            (5) 
 
Exogenous stochastic variables 
The two technologies, tA  and t , follow (1)AR  stochastic processes of the form: 
 
1(1 )
1
a
a a t
t tA A A e
                                                                                                         (6a) 
1(1 )
1
t
t t e
                                                                                                             (6b) 
 
where A  and   are constants, 0 , 1a     are auto-regressive parameters and 
,at t
   are Gaussian i.i.d. shocks with zero means and known variances, 2a  and 2 . 
                                                          
4 The motion of natural resources in (3) is as in Jouvet et al. (2005); see p. 1599 in their paper for 
further details. The inclusion of the parameter 0Q   is helpful when we solve the model numerically. 
 
 
5
 
Decentralized competitive equilibrium (given output taxes) 
The Decentralized Competitive Equilibrium (DCE) of the above economy is 
summarized by the following equations at 0t   (see Appendix A for details):  
 
1 (1 ) (1 )
k
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                                                                                      (7a) 
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where (1 ) 1 (1 )(1 )( ) ( )t t t
t
u c Q
c
         . This is a three-equation system in 
1 1 0{ , , }t t t tc k Q

    given the tax rates, 0{ }t t  , initial conditions for the stock variables, 
0k  and 0Q , and stochastic processes for the exogenous variables, tA  and t . Section 4 
will choose the optimal tax rate. 
 
3. Social planner’s solution (first best)    
 
This will serve as a benchmark. The social planner chooses allocations 
1 1 0{ , , , }t t t t tc g k Q

    directly to maximize (1a-b) subject to resource constraints only. 
The solution is (see Appendix B for details): 
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Q
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
    and 
0t   is a dynamic multiplier associated with (8c). We thus have a five-equation 
system in 1 1 0{ , , , , }t t t t t tc g k Q      given initial conditions for the stock variables, 0k  and 
0Q , and stochastic processes for the exogenous variables, tA  and t .  
 
4. Second-best optimal allocation and comparison with the first best  
  
This section compares social welfare under the decentralized economy in section 2 to 
social welfare under the first-best solution in section 3. Social welfare is defined as 
the conditional expectation of the discounted sum of household’s lifetime utility in 
(1a-b) above.  
 
How we work 
Since the DCE solution and the associated welfare in section 2 depend on the value of 
the output tax rate, we search for the welfare-maximizing value of the output tax rate 
and the associated maximum second-best welfare. In particular, focusing on flat tax 
rates, namely, tax rates that remain constant over time (see also e.g. Lucas, 1990, 
Stokey and Rebelo, 1995, Mendoza and Tesar, 1998, and Ortigueira, 1998), we 
compute welfare for a wide range of values of the flat tax rate and thus find the 
welfare-maximizing value of the tax rate and the associated maximum welfare in the 
second-best case. We then compare this second-best welfare to the welfare derived 
from the social planner’s first-best solution in section 3.  
 To solve the system of non-linear expected difference equations that form the 
DCE in (7a-c) and then search for the welfare-maximizing value of the output tax rate, 
we approximate the equilibrium equations (7a-c), as well as the welfare criterion in 
(1a-b), to second-order around the non-stochastic second-best steady state solution. 
We work similarly in the case of the social planner; namely, we approximate the 
equilibrium equations (8a)-(8e), as well as (1a-b), to second-order around the non-
stochastic first-best steady state solution. Regarding the equilibrium solutions, (7a-c) 
and (8a-e), we solve and simulate their second-order approximations following the 
methodology and using the Matlab codes made available by Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe 
(2004). Regarding the welfare criterion, (1a-b), its second-order approximation is:   
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where, for any variable tx , ˆ ln( / ) ( ) /t t tx x x x x x    and x  is the long-run value of 
tx . Also, 1 (1 ) ( , )a u c Q   , 2 (1 )(1 ) ( , )a u c Q    , 
2 2
3
(1 ) ( , )
2
u c Qa   , 
2 2
4
(1 ) (1 ) ( , )
2
u c Qa    , 25 (1 )(1 ) ( , )a u c Q     . The values of tˆc  and ˆtQ  
follow from the second-order approximation to the equilibrium solutions in (7a)-(7c) 
and (8a)-(8c) respectively as said above. 
Finally, we need a measure of comparison of welfare gains/losses when we 
move from first-best to second-best regimes. This measure, denoted as ij  in what 
follows, is obtained by computing the percentage compensation in private 
consumption that the private agent would require in each time-period under regime j  
so as to be equally well off between regimes i  and j i . This is a popular measure in 
dynamic general equilibrium models (see e.g. Lucas, 1990).  
 
Parameter values used  
We keep all parameter values the same across different regimes, so that the evaluation 
of different regimes is not blurred by parameter differences. The parameter values 
used are reported in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 around here 
 
The values of the economic parameters are standard. In particular, the time 
preference rate ( ), the depreciation rate of capital ( k ), the capital share in output 
( ), the intertemporal elasticity of substitution ( /1 ), the constant term ( A ) and the 
persistence parameter ( a ) in the TFP process, are as in most dynamic stochastic 
general equilibrium calibration and estimation studies (see e.g. King and Rebelo, 
1999). We will experiment with different values of the standard deviation of the TFP 
process,  , in equation (6a). 
There is less empirical evidence and consensus on the value of environmental 
parameters. Regarding the value of  , which is the weight given to private 
consumption vis-à-vis environmental quality in the utility function, we set it at 0.6, so 
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that the weight given to environmental quality is 0.4. The latter is higher than the 
value given usually to simple public goods in related utility functions. Regarding the 
parameters in the exogenous stochastic process for environmental technology in (6b), 
we choose a high persistence parameter, 933.0   , normalize its constant 
term,  , at 0.5, and experiment with different values of its standard deviation,  . 
Regarding the parameters in the motion for environmental quality in (3), we choose a 
relatively high persistence parameter, 9.0q , and normalize its constant term (i.e. 
the level of environmental quality without economic activity) to unity, 1Q . Finally, 
we set v  (i.e. how public abatement spending is translated into actual units of 
environmental quality) at 5; this parameter value helps us to match the units in the 
environmental quality equation (3) and obtain a well-defined trade-off in second-best 
optimal policy. Notice that since v  is the same across regimes, its value does not 
matter for the comparison of these two regimes.   
 
Welfare results under uncertainty 
We assume that the economy is initially at its steady state and, starting from 0t  , 
there are shocks to tA  and t , which are the exogenous stochastic autoregressive 
processes for production and pollution technologies in (6a)-(6b). We compute the 
discounted expected lifetime utility for a varying degree of uncertainty as summarized 
by the standard deviations of the production and pollution technologies, a  and  . 
We do so for both the first-best and the second-best case, and then compare them, as 
explained above.  
 Welfare results for the two cases are reported in Table 2, while Tables 3a-b 
present first and second moments of the arguments in the utility function under the 
first-best and the second-best case respectively. For expositional reasons, we study: (i) 
a deterministic economy ( 0a    ); (ii) when there is only one source of 
uncertainty ( 01.0  and 0 ; 05.0  and 0 ; 0  and 01.0 ; 
0  and 05.0 ); (iii) a scenario of relatively low uncertainty in both stochastic 
variables ( 0.01    ); (iv) two scenarios representing high levels of uncertainty 
in one of the two stochastic variables ( 01.0  and 0.05  ; and 0.05  , 
01.0 ); (v) a scenario with relatively high uncertainty in both stochastic variables 
( 0.05a    ). 
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Tables 2 and 3a-b around here 
  
 The first result to observe in Table 2 is that when environmental uncertainty 
increases, welfare increases. The reason why this happens can be understood by 
looking at the first and second moments in Tables 3a-b. In particular, regarding the 
first-best allocation, as environmental uncertainty increases, both consumption and 
environmental quality increase. This seemingly paradoxical result happens because 
the social planner wishes to stabilize the environmental process, and the way to 
achieve this is through higher abatement. The latter necessitates an increase in output, 
so that more resources are made available for both consumption and abatement. In 
other words, environmental uncertainty creates a form of precautionary behavior that 
is welfare increasing. The increases in consumption and output more than compensate 
for the welfare losses due to higher volatility of consumption and environmental 
quality. On the other hand, the model generates the expected result that higher TFP 
uncertainty decreases welfare, for a standard parameterization of the risk aversion in 
the utility function.  The same pattern is observed under second-best optimal policy. 
However, because of the distortions introduced by the output tax rate, now the 
increases in consumption and environmental quality are smaller. Nevertheless, the 
negative correlation between these two variables helps to increase welfare. 
We next compare first best to second best. This is summarized by the values of 
12  reported in the last column of Table 2. These values are all positive, as expected, 
meaning that the first best is superior or, equivalently, the household who lives in the 
second-best world would require an extra consumption subsidy in each time period to 
be indifferent between second best and first best.   
 In the deterministic case, 0a    , social welfare rises by 4.65%, when we 
move from second best to first best. In a stochastic world, the results are similar. For 
instance, when 0.05   and 0.01  , a welfare gain of 4.79% can be obtained if 
we move from second best to first best.   
It is interesting to note that the degree of relative superiority of the first-best 
allocation depends on the source and size of uncertainty. When there is only economic 
uncertainty ( 0  and 0 ), the relative superiority of first best over second 
best decreases with the degree of uncertainty. For instance, when 01.0 , a 
welfare gain of 4.6% is obtained if we move from the second best to first best, 
whereas the welfare gain decreases to 4.5% when 05.0 . This is despite the fact 
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that in absolute terms, the welfare difference between the two regimes increases. As 
the economy moves to a worse equilibrium, it matters less, in relative terms, whether 
first- or second-best optimal policies are chosen. On the other hand, when there is 
only environmental uncertainty ( 0  and 0  ), the relative superiority of first 
best over second best increases with the degree of uncertainty. For instance, when 
01.0 , a welfare gain of 4.65% can be obtained if we move from second best to 
first best, whereas the welfare gain rises to 4.83% when 0.05  . As the economy 
moves to a better equilibrium, it matters more, in relative terms, whether first- or 
second-best optimal policies are chosen. 
In all other more general cases in which both variances are positive, the same 
message applies. Namely, given   (resp.  ), the superiority of first best decreases 
(resp. increases) as   (resp.  ) increases. Also, if both   and   increase, but it 
is the increase in the latter (resp. former) that dominates, the relative superiority of 
first best increases (resp. decreases) as uncertainty increases.  
 
5. Concluding remarks and possible extensions  
 
We compared second-best optimal environmental policies and the resulting 
allocations to first-best allocations in a micro-founded dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium model. We focused on the role of uncertainty and showed that the source 
and magnitude of extrinsic uncertainty matter to optimal choices and welfare under 
both first- and second-best optimal allocations. In this paper, we focused on taxes in 
the second-best case. An extension could be to study other policy instruments, like 
pollution permits and emission rules.      
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Table 1: Baseline parameter values 
 
Parameter Description Value 
  Capital share in production 0.33 
k  capital depreciation rate 0.1 
  curvature parameter in utility function 2 
  Time discount factor 0.97 
  Consumption weight in utility function 0.6 
Q  environmental quality without pollution 1 
q  persistence of environmental quality 0.9 
A  Long-run total factor productivity 1 
a  persistence of total factor productivity 0.933   long-run pollution technology 0.5 
  Persistence of pollution technology 0.933 
  transformation of spending into units of nature 5 
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Table 2: Expected lifetime utility (ELU) 
 
 
Notes: (i) The value of ij  is given by 1 log( / ) 100(1 )
i j
ij t tV V X    , where 
i
tV  and 
j
tV  
denote the discounted sums of second-order approximations to welfare in equation (9) and averaged 
over 1000 simulations. (ii) To evaluate the expectation in the welfare calculations, we use numerical 
integration with 1000 simulations. As said, we use 300 years in our evaluation of life-time welfare 
since, because of discounting, there is practically a zero weight attached to later outcomes.   
 
 
a  
 
 
  
(1) 
First-best ELU 
 
(2) 
Second-best ELU 
 
ELU 
maximizing tax 
rate ( ) 
 
12  
(%) 
 
 
0 
 
0 
 
- 13.41 
 
 
- 14.30 
 
 
0.3319 
 
 
4.65 
 
0 
 
0.01 
 
- 13.41 
 
- 14.30 
 
 
0.3321 
 
4.65 
 
0 
 
 
0.05 
 
-13.32 
 
-14.24 
 
0.3319 
 
 
4.83 
 
0.01 
 
0 
 
 
- 13.55 
 
 
- 14.44 
 
 
0.3318 
 
4.60 
 
0.05 
 
 
0 
 
 
- 16.97 
 
 
- 18.06 
 
 
0.3288 
 
4.50 
 
0.01 
 
 
0.01 
 
- 13.55 
 
 
- 14.45 
 
 
0.3320 
 
4.65 
 
0.01 
 
 
0.05 
 
- 13.46 
 
 
- 14.38 
 
 
0.3318 
 
4.79 
 
0.05 
 
 
0.01 
 
- 16.98 
 
 
- 18.07 
 
 
0.3290 
 
4.50 
 
0.05 
 
 
0.05 
 
-16.89 
 
- 18.00 
 
 
0.3289 
 
4.61 
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Table 3a: First and second moments for tc  and tQ  under first best 
 
 
a  
 
  
 
 
)( tcE  
 
)( tQE  
 
)( tc  
 
)( tQ  
 
),( tt Qc  
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
0.68095 
 
17.337 
 
 
0 
 
0 
 
1 
 
0 
 
0.01 
 
0.68095 
 
17.336 
 
0.0019836 
 
0.059818 
 
0.81934 
 
 
0 
 
 
0.05 0.68166 
 
17.355 
 
0.0099509 
 
0.30013 
 
0.81871 
 
 
0.01 
 
0 
 
0.68065 
 
17.34 
 
0.018118 
 
0.54766 
 
0.82251 
 
 
0.05 
 
 
0 0.67275 
 
17.408 
 
0.089786 
 
2.7623 
 
0.81975 
 
 
0.01 
 
0.01 
 
0.68065 
 
17.34 
 
0.018226 
 
0.55094 
 
0.82218 
 
 
0.01 
 
0.05 
 
0.68136 
 
17.359 
 
0.020698 
 
0.62571 
 
0.82074 
 
 
0.05 
 
0.01 
 
0.67274 
 
17.408 
 
0.08981 
 
2.763 
 
0.8197 
 
 
0.05 
 
0.05 
 
0.67346 
 
17.428 
 
0.090444 
 
2.7831 
 
0.81946 
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Table 3b: First and second moments for tc  and tQ  under second best 
 
 
a  
 
  
 
 
)( tcE  
 
)( tQE  
 
)( tc  
 
)( tQ  
 
),( tt Qc  
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
0.64593 
 
15.988 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
1 
 
0 
 
0.01 
 
0.64565 
 
15.998 
 
0.0003 
 
0.11943 
 
- 0.41974 
 
 
0 
 
 
0.05 0.64593 
 
16.027 
 
0.0015 
 
0.59828 
 
- 0.4188 
 
 
0.01 
 
0 
 
0.64594 
 
15.984 
 
0.020051 
 
0.43533 
 
0.84781 
 
 
0.05 
 
 
0 0.64616 
 
15.828 
 
0.10056 
 
2.1679 
 
0.84631 
 
 
0.01 
 
0.01 
 
0.64565 
 
15.994 
 
0.020043 
 
0.45187 
 
0.81163 
 
 
0.01 
 
0.05 
 
0.64594 
 
16.023 
 
0.020106 
 
0.74281 
 
0.45248 
 
 
0.05 
 
0.01 
 
0.64588 
 
15.838 
 
0.10051 
 
2.1731 
 
0.84464 
 
 
0.05 
 
0.05 
 
0.64602 
 
15.874 
 
0.10054 
 
2.2602 
 
0.80892 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A: DCE with taxes 
The first-order conditions of the individual’s problem include the budget constraint in 
(2) and the Euler equation (7b). Then, using (4)-(5) into (3), we get (7c). All this gives 
(7a-c) which is a three-equation system in 1 1 0{ , , }t t t tc k Q

    in terms of 0{ }t t  . The 
long-run DCE follows if we simply drop time subscripts.   
 
Appendix B: Social planner’s solution   
The planner chooses 1 1 0{ , , , }t t t t tc g k Q

    to maximize (1a-b) subject to the resource 
constraints: 
1 (1 )
k
t t t t t tk k c g A k
                                                                                     (B.1a)                              
1 (1 )
q q
t t t t t tQ Q Q A k g
                                                                             (B.1b) 
The optimality conditions include (D.1a), (D.1b) and:  
1 11
1 1 1 1 1 1
1
(1 )kt t t t t t t t
t t
u u A k A k
c c
             

                                                   (B.2a)                              
1
1
1
qt
t t
t
u
Q
    

                                                                                              (B.2b)   
t
t
t
u
c
                                                                                                                   (B.2c) 
where 0  is a dynamic multiplier associated with (B.1b), 
(1 ) 1 (1 )(1 )( ) ( )t t t
t
u c Q
c
         , and 
(1 ) (1 )(1 ) 11
1 1
1
(1 )( ) ( )t t t
t
u
c Q
Q
         

   . (B.1a)-
(B.1b) and (B.2a)-(B.2c) constitute a five-equation system in   011 ,,,, tttttt gQkc  . 
The long-run follows if we drop time subscripts.   
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